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Abstract — Mobile apps exploit embedded sensors and 
wireless connectivity of a device to empower users with 
portable computations, context-aware communication, and 
enhanced interaction. Specifically, mobile health apps 
(mHealth apps for short) are becoming integral part of mobile 
and pervasive computing to improve the availability and 
quality of healthcare services. Despite the offered benefits, 
mHealth apps face a critical challenge, i.e., security of health 
critical data that is produced and consumed by the 
app.  Several studies have revealed that security specific issues 
of mHealth apps have not been adequately addressed. The 
objectives of this study are to empirically (a) investigate the 
challenges that hinder development of secure mHealth apps, 
(b) identify practices to develop secure apps, and (c) explore 
motivating factors that influence secure development. We 
conducted this study by collecting responses of 97 developers 
from 25 countries – across 06 continents – working in diverse 
teams and roles to develop mHealth apps for Android, iOS, 
and Windows platform. Qualitative analysis of the survey data 
is based on (i) 8 critical challenges, (ii) taxonomy of best 
practices to ensure security, and (iii) 6 motivating factors that 
impact secure mHealth apps. This research provides empirical 
evidence as practitioners’ view and guidelines to develop 
emerging and next generation of secure mHealth apps.  
Keywords—Empirical Software Engineering, Secure Software 
Development, Mobile Health, Software Engineering for Mobile 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Mobile health apps empower healthcare stakeholders 
(i.e., medics, patients, etc.) to exploit embedded sensors of a 
device for health diagnostics such as monitoring body 
temperature, pulse rate, and blood pressure [1]. mHealth apps 
rely on portability and context-sensitivity of mobile 
computing to improve access to healthcare services that are 
cost-effective, scalable, and pervasive [2]. World Health 
Organization (WHO) has defined mHealth as “medical and 
public health practice supported by mobile devices, such as 
mobile phones, patient monitoring devices, personal digital 
assistants (PDAs), and other wireless devices [3]”. mHealth 
apps range from decision support for reproductive health to 
fitness monitoring apps for nutrition management [4]. The 
usage of mHealth apps by healthcare practitioners and 
patients is on the rise with 350000 such apps available in two 
app repositories provided by Android and iOS platforms [5]. 
Mobile apps in general and mHealth apps in particular 
collect, process, store, and transmit user and device data in 
and out of a device over various networks [4]. Typical 
examples of such apps are location services or a banking 
app that needs device's type and ID, user's location and 
preferences to function properly [6-8]. Any compromise on 
the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of such data 
leads to severe consequences including but not limited to 
compromised devices, location and activity tracing, and 
financial loss. Therefore, security of mobile apps is a critical 
concern for users (data security) and app providers (secure 
app development) [9]. In the case of mHealth, security of 
mobile apps becomes a significant concern due to privacy 
and integrity of health critical data [4, 10] as  an attack can 
modify the blood pressure or pulse rate of a patient that has 
medical, legal, and social consequences [11]. 
Existing research such as [1, 6, 11-14] indicate that 
security of mHealth apps lags behind the capabilities of 
adversaries and the sophistication of cyber-attacks that 
target the apps. A recent study suggests that despite their 
benefits, a wide spread adoption of mHealth apps is 
hindered due to users' concern about security and privacy of 
their personal and health critical information [15]. To 
address such issues, it becomes vital to investigate the 
security of mHealth apps by incorporating practitioners’ 
view on challenges, best practices, and motivations to 
ensure secure mHealth apps. Such an investigation can help 
us to understand and address some fundamental issues such 
as why mHealth apps are not secure? and what efforts could 
be made to make them secure? In this paper, we investigate 
the security of mHealth apps based on developers’1 view to 
understand (i) critical challenges that hinder development of 
secure apps (ii) development practices to ensure security of 
the apps, and (iii) motivations for secure app development. 
We outline the Research Questions (RQs) as below: 
RQ1: What challenges do developers face in 
developing secure mHealth apps? 
RQ2: What practices are used to incorporate security 
measures in mHealth apps? 
RQ3: What motivates developers to engineer and 
develop secure mHealth apps? 
 
We conducted a web-based survey that received 
responses from 97 app developers. Demography analysis of 
developers’ data indicates their experiences, team 
size/dynamics, and professional roles to develop mHealth 
apps for mobile platforms including Android, iOS, and 
Windows. To ensure the quality of responses, we only 
allowed developers with first-hand experience of developing 
mHealth apps to participate in our survey. The results can be 
beneficial for researchers and practitioners (e.g., mHealth 
app developers, managers, research engineers) to support 
research and development of emerging and next generation 
of secure mHealth apps.  
II.  RELATED WORK 
We organized the related work in three themes (i) security 
issues, (ii) development challenges, and (ii) developers' 
practices and motivations for secure app development. 
                                                          
1
The terms developer, practitioner, respondent, and participant have been 
used interchangeably in this paper all referring to professionals who are 
engaged with engineering and development of secure mHealth mobile apps. 
A. Security Issues with Current mHealth Apps 
A recent mapping study [16] of 365 papers on m/uhealth 
security and privacy highlights that the security and privacy 
specific education and training for developers is one of the 
critical factors to support secure development of mHealth 
systems. Some other studies have focused on investigating 
security of mHealth apps by means of assessment experiment 
[1], static and dynamic analysis [6], comparative analysis 
[11], security assessment [12], and vulnerability scanning 
[13]. These studies revealed that most of the mHealth apps 
lack the incorporation of security countermeasures, such as 
access control and threat detection. For example, He et al. 
[14] revealed that several mHealth apps are prone to attacks 
due to inherent vulnerabilities such as transmitting mHealth 
data in unencrypted form and logging sensitive information. 
Moreover, numerous mHealth apps were found to have 
component exposure threats and some apps store 
unencrypted information on external storage, e.g., SD Card, 
where a malicious app can read and modify it [14]. In [6], the 
authors have reported that mHealth apps developers may fail 
to appropriately implement even the basic security solutions 
such as authentication, access control, and data encryption 
that impacts security and privacy of health  information. 
B. Challenges to Develop Secure mHealth Apps 
Through a systematic review [17], we identified that in 
order to ensure security of mHealth apps throughout their 
development lifecycle, the developers need to be vigilant 
about security-related issues. Contrary to the finding of [16, 
17], some studies highlight that mHealth apps developers are 
not even familiar with fundamental solutions such as security 
measures [13, 18], security tools [8], and trusted libraries 
[12, 19] that are critical for secure apps development. 
Developing mHealth apps needs updated Security 
Knowledge (SK), especially knowledge about connecting 
mHealth apps technologies that are driven by context-
sensitive and pervasive computing enabled by mobile and 
Internet of Things (IoT) [14]. It is vital to mention that the 
primary purpose of health and security regulations (e.g., 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act - 
HIPAA) is to protect health critical data and to promote 
trustworthy systems. However, such regulations do not 
provide explicit guidelines, processes, and methods to assist 
the stakeholders (e.g., users, developers) of mHealth apps [2, 
10]. Moreover, frameworks and standards for developing 
secure mHealth apps are still missing from the existing 
regulations, policies, and development initiatives [6, 11, 13].  
During software development, project specific constraints 
such as time and cost to deliver, can pressurize developers to 
focus on satisfying functional specifications first and 
patching advanced security issues after initial release [4, 18]. 
Patching security specifications in a released app is a costly 
approach and introduces new vulnerabilities after fixing the 
existing issues [1]. Also, the lack of security testing due to 
development project constraints for mHealth apps is a 
challenge that has been reported [1, 18, 20]. Other issues 
such as absence of security experts, lack of understanding for 
security testing tools, and shortage of budget to conduct app 
testing are attributed as fundamental challenges for 
developing secure apps. 
C. Developers’ Practices and Motivations 
A lack of adoption or poor understanding of security 
practices by mHealth apps developers’ hinders the 
development process for secure software engineering [3]. 
The consequences of compromised security practices – 
during software development lifecycle (SDLC) – makes apps 
vulnerable, such as permitting an app to share health critical 
data with other mobile apps (e.g., untrusted apps or external 
untrusted hosts [2]). Thamilarasu et al. [18] examined top 15 
Android-based mHealth apps and found 248 vulnerabilities. 
The study identified that top 3 vulnerabilities were caused by 
development practices followed by developers, e.g., selection 
of cipher method or implementation of specific algorithms to 
request or grant permissions. It concludes that most of these 
vulnerabilities could have been prevented by adopting 
development practices that adhere to secure SDLC.  
Developers’ and team motivation are two of the key 
success factors for software projects [21]. Many security 
incidents are primarily caused by human rather than system 
failures [22]. Motivational factors that help mobile apps 
developers to achieve security were discussed by Weir et al. 
in [23]. The study concluded that developers were motivated 
by their SK and experience, considering security as a task 
that needs to be done in the right way, impacts of developing 
insecure software, and pursuing secure development as an 
enthusiasm. Developers motivation for secure software 
development when coupled with security specific education 
and training is among the most important factors for security 
of mHealth apps [17]. Reusing source code from a previous 
project is a common practice to promote reusability and cost 
effectiveness; nevertheless, security bugs can be inherited 
[11-14]. Also, copying or reusing the source code from web-
based public repositories (e.g., Stack Overflow - SO, 
GitHub) without further examination of the source code is a 
common practice among app developers that leads to 
developing vulnerable apps. The impact of copy/pasting of 
source code from SO to Android apps has been investigated 
in [24]. The study revealed that 97.9% of the copy/pasted 
code contained at least one insecure code snippet. 
To the best of our knowledge, there is no empirical study to 
accumulate the evidence of developers’ perspective to 
investigate the challenges, practices, and motivations for 
developing secure mHealth apps. Our study provides 
empirical basis for the development practices that enable or 
enhance secure app development for mHealth systems. 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
In this section, we detail four phase research design to 
conduct and document the proposed study. Each of the 
research phases is detailed below and illustrated in Fig. 1. 
A. Phase I - Study Protocol and Questionaire 
 We designed an online survey based on the findings of 
our systematic review [17] and guidelines by Kitchenham 
and Pfleeger [25]. As in Fig. 1, we utilized an online 
platform (Google Forms) that is easy to share, view, and 
manage across platforms. In the survey preamble, we briefly 
described the purpose and eligibility of our study. The survey 
contained 14 Questions (Q1 to Q14) designed to answer RQs 
(Section I). The link to online survey is provided in [26]. 
Q1-Q3 were screening questions to ensure that we engage 
developers with experience of mHealth apps. Selecting the 
option of zero apps redirected the respondent to submission 
section, indicating that s/he was not eligible to participate in 
the study. Respondents were asked to provide the name and 
link for at-least one mHealth app to ensure their eligibility. 
Q4-Q9 were demography specific questions including but 
not limited to years of experience, team size, work pattern. 
Q10-Q12 aimed to understand the challenges for secure 
mHealth apps. In Q10, we proposed a few statements using 
Likert-scale questions to rate the respondents' agreement to 
the reported challenges [17]. Q12 aimed to find out the 
practices by respondents to ensure the security of their apps. 
 
 
Fig.1. Overview of the Research Design 
Q13-Q14 aimed to identify the developers’ motivations to 
develop secure mHealth apps. A few motivating factors were 
proposed in Q13 to rate respondents’ agreement. We also 
provided an optional question at the end of our survey to 
allow respondents to share their comments/feedback. 
Pilot and Final Survey: It should be noted that the survey 
questions were slightly modified (e.g., adding questions and 
removing ambiguity) during response collection. First, we 
revised the survey after 05 responses and second revision 
happened after19 responses. Our survey was designed in 
English and took around 15 minutes to complete. Our study 
is approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee at the 
University of Adelaide (H-2019-115).  
B. Phase II - Inviting and Engaging the Participants 
Since this study sought specific type of developers (i.e., 
Q1-Q3, Screening in Phase I), we used a different method to 
ensure that all respondents meet our selection criteria. As in 
Fig. 1, first, we emailed our contacts having experience with 
developing mHealth apps and asking them to participate in 
the survey. Secondly, we extracted the email addresses of 
mobile apps developers from GitHub and Google Play 
which were publicly available in their profiles. We sent an 
invitation to over 1300 mobile apps developers. Thirdly, we 
posted our survey on several mobile apps developers’ 
groups on prominent social media platforms (LinkedIn, 
Facebook, and Reddit, etc). Finally, we followed the 
snowballing method to reach more respondents. We 
obtained 97 valid responses. We obtained 37 responses from 
social media platforms, 29 from GitHub and Google Play 
users, 17 from personal contacts via email invitations, and 
14 through snowballing technique. The details of the 
responses from the participants are available at [29]. 
C. Phase III – Demography Analysis of Survey Respondents 
We now present some important demography analysis of the 
survey respondents that is also referred to as developers’ 
information, as illustrated in Fig. 2. The demography 
analysis presented in Fig. 2 complements the survey 
responses (Q1-Q14) and helps us with fine-grained analysis 
of the survey results. For example, the platform(s) used for 
development in Fig. 2 (b) can help us understand the most 
and least preferred mobile computing platforms by 
developers to deploy their mHealth apps. Specific mobile 
platforms may pose different development challenges and 
encourage developers to adopt different practices for app 
development [1, 4]. In addition to the details in Fig. 2, 80% 
of the respondents had experience as full-time and 20% as 
part-time developers. All respondents were involved in 
mHealth apps development in various roles including but 
not limited to software engineers, project managers, 
technical leads, system architects, developers, and designers. 
The full details of the respondents’ professional roles are 
available in [26]. 
D. Phase IV – Synthesising and Analysisng Survey Data 
We analyzed the answers to the close-ended questions (e.g., 
Likert-scale) using descriptive statistics. For open-ended 
questions, we used thematic analysis method [27] to identify 
any recurring themes in the gathered responses. Thematic 
analysis supports extracting the data and synthesizing the 
results. We enhanced our analysis by using NVivo software, 
a popular computer-based tool, to organize and analyze data. 
The coding was initially done by one of the researchers in 
the team that was reviewed and revised (wherever required) 
by third researcher to avoid potential bias.  
Findings of the study: We now present the findings of the 
survey to answer to outlined RQs. Answers to the RQs are 
presented in the dedicated sections as: (i) security 
challenges (RQ1) in Section IV, (ii) development practices 
(RQ2) in Section V, and (iii) motivating factors (RQ3) in 
Section VI. 
IV. CHALLENGES OFSECURE MHEALTH APP DEVELOPMENT 
In order to identify the challenges faced by developers, i.e., 
answer to RQ1, we formulated 8 statements, (SC1 to SC8) 
based on the findings and guidelines of our SLR [17]. The 
statements capture the input of 97 respondents (R1 to R97) 
as illustrated in Fig. 3. For an objective interpretation and 
assessment, we sought developers’ feedback on each 
statement using five-scale Likert (Strongly Agree, Agree, Not 
Sure, Disagree, and Strongly Disagree) as in Fig. 3. 
Furthermore, the responses to these statements were 
complemented by an open-ended question that allowed 
developers to spontaneously share other challenges based on 
their knowledge and experience. The results of developers’ 
perspective on each of the 8 challenges are detailed below.  
SC1) Insufficient SK of the developers: 
Developing secure mHealth apps require proper SK. Typical 
examples of SK include but are not limited to coding 
practices, robust usage for security testing tools, and 
confidence in using third-party libraries that should be 
known by mHealth apps developers [16, 17]. We asked the 
respondents to rate their agreement or disagreement while 
considering insufficient SK as a challenge for developing 
secure mHealth apps. While 20% of the respondents 
disagreed, 80% of them affirmed that inadequate SK is a 
challenge for mHealth app development reflected as SC1 in 
Fig. 3. Some respondents elaborated that poor skills for 
 
 
Fig. 2. Demography Analysis of the Survey Respondents (mHealth App Developers) 
[(a) Geographical Distribution, (b) Development Platforms, (c) Number of Developed Apps, (d) Years of Development Experience, (e) Team Size]
secure programming is a critical challenge to develop secure 
apps. It was highlighted that mHealth apps developers face 
difficulties in using programming tools and reusing code 
that can be vulnerable. For example, as per the claims of 
R13 and R45 “Cloning of certain features by other 
developers” and “Picking up code written by the hacker 
represents a critical challenge”. Some respondents pointed 
out that they have a lack of SK in dealing with attacks and 
vulnerabilities. Specifically, R59 shared that “[him/her] not 
being aware of potential security risks” and R46 
emphasized that “mHealth apps developers need to put 
more effort to enhance their SK through R&D and learning 
new technologies”. 
SC2) Little or no budget for employing security: 
Developing secure software requires allocating a specific 
budget to be spent on enhancing security of developed and 
deployed apps [17]. We asked our respondents to rate their 
agreement or disagreement with SC2, i.e., little or no budget 
for employing security. 85% of them affirmed that 
developing secure mHealth apps cannot be achieved without 
assigning an adequate budget. Only 15% disagreed with the 
statement SC2 in Fig. 3. Our analysis of the responses 
revealed that lack of allocated budget for secure mHealth 
apps represents the most critical challenge. 
SC3) Lack of involvement of security experts during 
software development: The absence of security experts is 
being recognised as a factor that directly influences secure 
software development [28]. Involving security experts 
during apps development would give inexperienced 
developers access to the required SK (SC1) [17]. We asked 
our respondents if they consider lack of security experts’ 
involvement during the development as a challenge as SC3 
in Fig. 3. Given the responses, 70% of them lacked security 
experts within the team during mHealth app developmen; 
30% disagreed with this statement. We looked into the 
experiences of the respondents, who showed their 
disagreement from Fig. 2 (d) and data in [26]. We found that 
the majority of the respondents (20/27 respondents, i.e., 
74%) have more than 5 years of experience in developing 
mHealth apps. Hence, they depend on their ability and 
expertise in developing secure mHealth apps without relying 
on security experts. 
SC4) Poor security decisions during the development 
process: Developing mHealth apps requires making 
appropriate security decision with respect to storing and 
using health critical data [22, 24]. Poor security decisions 
during mHealth apps development would leave mHealth 
apps vulnerable to security threats. Besides, with the high 
cost of fixing flaws (e.g., security patching [4]), mHealth 
apps development organization may face technical and legal 
issues for data breach. Thus, mHealth apps developers’ and 
their organizations need to pay careful attention to security-
related decisions. We asked respondents about their view on 
security decisions during the development process, SC4 in 
Fig. 3. 66% agreed that making poor security decisions 
during the SDLC is a challenge, while 30% disagreed with 
this statement. Only 4% of our respondents were neutral.  
SC5) Assumption about security issues resolved by 
app testers: Ensuring security is a task that needs to be 
considered by software developers throughout the SDLC. 
However, Xie et al. in [29] concluded that one of the main 
 
 
Fig. 3. Responses for Critical Challenges Related to Security of mHealth Apps.
 
reasons that leads software developers to make security 
errors is relying on others, such as app testers. In fact, 66% 
agreed that app testers should make decisions about ignoring 
or identifying security flaws. 33% disagreed and only 1% 
were neutral, as SC5 in Fig.3. 
SC6) Project constraints to compromise security: 
Project constraints, specifically time to deliver and cost 
efficiency (SC2), represent common challenges for software 
engineering projects as well as for SDLC of secure mHealth 
apps [28]. Time to deliver – relative to market competition – 
forces development teams and developers to primarily focus 
on functional requirements and often overlooking or 
ignoring quality requirements that include security features. 
According to our respondents, 67% of them agreed that 
meeting app development deadlines pressurizes developers 
to compromise security requirements and their resting. 33% 
disagreed with this statement SC6 in Fig. 3. Respondents 
including R12, R37, R50, R58, and R62, commented that it 
is a challenge to ensure the security of mHealth apps due to 
time constraints. R62 climed that “Lack of time for app 
delivery stresses developers that impacts quality specific 
requirments such a security, performance, scalability and 
many more. In secure [mHealth] app project deadlines is a 
sigificant challenge for developers”. 
SC7) Lack of security testing: Security specific testing 
is a crucial phase throughout SDLC to identify potential 
vulnerabilities in security and privacy of developed app. In  
the context of mHealth apps, it helps to address security 
threats, such as unauthorised access to health data, 
tampering with health data or reporting invalid data to 
health providers. We asked our respondents if they consider 
lack of security testing as a challenge to develop secure 
mHealth apps. While 75% of respondents agreed with this 
statement, 24% indicated their disagreement and 1% were 
neutral for SC7 in Fig. 3. Five respondents R38, R45, R52, 
R62, R95 commented that the lack of rigorous testing for 
mHealth apps is the most critical challenge for them. 
SC8) Assuming that users are not that much 
interested in security: Security should be incorporated and 
addressed ideally throughout the SDLC from requirement 
analysis to deployemt [30]. Incorporating security at later 
phases of software development or after release in the form  
 
of security patches can be costly exercise and can introduce 
new vulnerabilities [31]. However, the trade-offs between 
security and other quality attributes such as usability, 
perfromance can be problematic. R27 and R63 indicated 
that app accuracy and performance are challenges that affect 
the development of secure mHealth apps. Consequently, 
developers might assume that users are not concerned about 
security and hence lower the priority given to security due to 
budgeting or time constraints. 62% of the respondents 
agreed that users are not interested in security. 38% 
disagreed as per SC8 in Fig. 3. Four respondents R54, R62, 
R73, R81 indicated that mHealth apps developers’ pay little 
or no attention to security. R62 stated that “We are yet to be 
engaged in a mobile health project where we put specific 
focus on security aspects of the app”. R54 claimed  that 
“There [are] very few developers in my community who 
bother about security”, and R73 indicated that “I think a 
large number of the other players in the space don't take it 
seriously enough. I think they aren't paranoid enough”. 
Other Challenges (Open-ened): In addition to close-
ended statements from SC1 to SC8, the respondents 
highlighted ‘other’ challenges, detailed below, they see as 
important but were not presented as survey questions.  
a) Dealing with legal obligations, policies and 
procedures: mHealth apps can be classified as low-risk apps 
(e.g., fitness apps) and high-risk apps (e.g., clinical decision-
support apps) [32]. Given the criticality and confidentiality 
of health critical data, various governments have established 
different compliances such as  HIPAA to ensure security 
and privacy. In this context, R39 and R57 highlighted that 
policies and regulations for mHealth app development are 
ideal but complex to implement and abide. Five respondents 
R9, R55, R60, R72, R91 found lack of guidelines, 
documentation, and better procedures to ensure app security. 
 b) Challenges of maintaining mHealth app and data: Six 
respondents R16, R29, R43, R57, R86, R92 indicated that 
there are difficulties in maintaining mHealth apps and data 
due to the complexity and privacy-preserving nature of data. 
Specifically, R16 stated that maintaining mHealth apps 
requires proper security management team. R57 suggested 
to keep third party libraries updated to avoid any security 
vulnerabilities from code exectuion. R29 pointed out that 
“continuous updates [are needed] so that you don't miss any 
new medications or information”. R43 and R92 mentioned 
that mobile phone and platform compatibility (e.g., Android, 
iOS etc. platforms) is a challenge in maintaining mHealth 
apps with R82 indicating that “Privacy preservation of the 
data collected by the app” is the most critical challenge. 
V. PRACTICES TO ENSURE SECURITY OF MHEALTH APPS 
In order to identify the developers’ practices, i.e., finding 
answer to RQ2, we explored how security is integrated 
during mHealth apps development process by our 
respondents. We used open-ended questions because we did 
not want to limit our respondents while sharing the practices 
they adopt and their relative experiences [29]. Although 
there are several guidelines for Secure Development 
Lifecycle such as [33], we used Microsoft secure software 
development process (5 development tasks) to analyse and 
document the provided responses by the developers. Based 
on the developers’ responses, we created a taxonomy of the 
development practices in Fig. 4 to classify the specific 
practices that ensure security during each task of a SDLC. 
The taxonomy in Fig. 4 also helps with conceptualisation 
and quick identification of all the practices that developer 
perceive as effective to enable or enhance app security. 
Task I – Requirements Engineering: As the intial task 
of SDLC, requirements engineering involves identifying, 
specifying, managing, and implementing security 
requirements for the app to be developed. Engaging 
stakeholders in security requirement enginering is being 
recognised as a key to software success, as well as getting 
effective outcomes. In Section IV (SC4, Fig. 3), we reported 
that poor security decisions could be caused by lack of 
stakeholders’ involvement in SDLC. Three respondents 
identified as R60, R78, R96 indicated that they involve 
users feedback and try to negotiate requirements with users 
as an approach to employing security during requiremnets 
engineering. For example, the respondent R78 claimed that 
“In my case, it [requirements engineering] involved 
discussing requirements and what would be the most 
sensible solution to ensure security requirements”. 
Task II – Software Design: This task is essential to 
represent the identified security as a design or blueprint of 
the software to be implemented. R45, and R60 indicated 
that selecting the right development platform and supporting 
tools would help to enhance the security of mHealth apps. 
Four respondents R28, R60, R82, R85 mentioned that 
adhering to security guidelines helps ensure security of 
mHealth apps. R45 and R48 pointed out that as a design 
consideration, minimising data collection, sharing and 
asking for personal information positively impacts security 
of mHealth apps. R51 and R52 indicated that they ensure 
the security of mHealth apps through utilising a layered 
approach (incorporating a dedeictaed security layer) and 
secure data storage. Also, using security frameworks, 
standards along with policies would help to design secure 
mHealth apps and comply with security regulations. 
Furthermore, R57 and R72 indicated that they analyze and 
map the attack surface. R72 claimed that “Thinking about 
all ways where hackers could be intrusive can help design 
possible scenarios to countermeasure security breaches”. 
Task III – Software Implementation: This task of 
SDLC is about writing the source code to implement the 
design (Task II) based on the identified security 
requirements (Task I). App implementation focuses on 
coding/implementing security measures (e.g., encryption, 
anoynymisation) into apps. R57 and R74 indicated using 
trusted libraries or APIs as a best practise to ensure the 
security of mHealth apps. R57 suggsted that he is 
“Following industry specific [code libraries, APIs] 
practices rather writing custom cource code to ensure app 
security”. R74 claimd that“[…], we [as part of development 
team] just do basic AES encryption of user data”. R30 and 
R38 mentioned that they utilise static analysis [6] of source 
code as part of implementation task to ensure the security of 
mHealth apps. 
Task IV – Software Verification: It aims to analyse the 
implemented app (Task III) and identify potential flaws that 
can be exploited for malicious access. As part of software 
verification, app testing is an effective approach to 
determine security vulnerabilities and threats, thus, 
employing suitable measures [4, 10]. Analyzing the 
responses, we found that 16 respondents have indicated app 
testing as their best practice to ensure security. Specifically, 
app testing involves practices such as attack simulation, data 
flow testing, code review, and penetration tests. R86 
mentioned that, “Testing app vulnerabilities by simulating 
attacks is an effective practice to assess security strength of 
the application”. R84 and R90 mentioned that they conduct 
data specific testing (e.g., data leakage testing, data 
encryption testing). R83 and R97 mentioned internal code 
review as a proven practise to test security strength of their 
apps. R83 suggested about, “Multiple people to review 
source code [can avoid potential bias of code inspection]”. 
Five respondents R9, R39, R57, R73, R89 indicated that 
they performed testing with external security experts. R9 
mentioned “Hiring a computer security firm to run 
penetration tests”, and R89 suggested “Invite third-party 
companies for  security audit and testing”.  
Task V – Software Deployment: As the last task of SDLC, it 
refers to the release and deployment of the app to be used by 
users. One of the respondents, R37, indicated that they 
perform a final security review to ensure the security of 
mHealth apps.  One respondent R4 believed that most of the 
developers are only able to fix security flaws after 
deployment and user testing. R4 claimed that,“[in our team] 
we found that most of our peers approach security testing 
during deployment, once the system is operational”. 
Furthermore, automatic vulnerability patching is an 
approach to ensure the security of mHealth apps. The 
overall responses regarding security practices  suggested: 
a) Security-aware SDLC: Considering security 
throughout a SDLC is a best practice to develop secure 
software. This practice not only ensures an incremental 
security (from requirements to deployment) but also reduces 
the cost and efforts of fixing security errors afterwards in the 
form of security patches. Five respondents R26, R55, R73, 
R74, R85 indicated that throughout the SDLC satisfying 
security requirements of mHealth apps remain their primary 
concern. R74 suggested that “[Development] should be 
more concerned about security before as cyber attacks 
frequency increases”, and R26 suggested, “Preserving user 
personal information from any leakage is ultimate success of 
any secure development process”. Also, R39 and R57 
indicated that they consult security experts throughout 
SDLC. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Taxonomy of Development Practices for Secure mHealth Apps. 
 
a) No security approach is being considered: While 
security becomes an important concern during SDLC, yet 
according to a few respondents, it still not much of a 
concern to them. Four respondents R62, R70, R71, R81 
indicated that they did not follow any approach to address 
security during the development process. R61 claimed that 
“We are yet to be engaged in a mobile health project where 
we paid specific focus to the security aspect”, and R70 
claimed that “No process most of the time. Development 
teams [due to project constrainst and commercial reasons] 
have no direct link with medical teams (stakeholers), and 
due to this lack of interaction, user are using apps that can 
be disastrous for security and privacy of mHealth data”. 
 
VI. Motivations to Ensure Secure App Development 
 
To identify the motivating factors for secure mHealth 
app development, i.e., to answer to RQ3, we formulated 6 
statements (SM1 to SM6) based on the findings and 
guidelines of our SLR [17]. The statements capture the 
responses of 97 respondents (R1 to R97) as illustrated in 
Fig. 5. To objectively interpret and assess the responses, we 
sought developers’ feedback on each statement using five-
scale Likert (Strongly Agree, Agree, Not Sure, Disagree, 
and Strongly Disagree) as in Fig. 5. In addition, input to 
these statements was complemented by an open-ended 
question to allow developers to share other motivating 
factors based on their knowledge and experience.  
SM1) Security Leader in the Team to Influence the 
Development of Secure mHealth Apps: Commitment to 
improving the security is one of the main goals that security 
team leads aim to achieve. The respondents R2 and R38 
indicated that they follow security experts’ comments and 
guidelines to ensure security. Specifically, R2 claimed that 
“Following security department feedback is required during 
the design”, and R38 sugested that “[...] and following the 
guidelines of Security Expert”. 59% of the respondents 
agreed that a security specialist as team leader  influences 
and motivates them to develop secure mHealth apps. 36% 
disagreed and 5% remained neutral on the role of security 
leaders in the team as SM1 in Fig. 5. 
SM2) Secure Development to Maintain Vision and 
Reputation of the Organization: Creating and maintaining 
the reputation is a common goal that software development 
organizations seek to fulfil their vision. R45, R69, R91 
emphasised that they consider maintaining organization 
reputation’s, building trust and credibility as their 
motivations to develop secure mHealth apps. R45 claimed 
that “[…] and the second thing is by developing a secure 
application, the client's trust will become strong”. 
Satisfying end users can also help to maintain the 
organization’s reputation and fulfil its vision. Four 
respondents R27, R61, R72, R92 commented that patients’ 
expectation, users’ expectations and satisfaction are their 
motivations. One respondent mentioned that developing 
secure mHealth apps also proves organization’s proficiency 
to deliver security-enabled software. R4 claimed that, “I 
develop secure applications, and share our experience, so 
we can grow a stronger development community within our 
local market”. In fact, 81% of the respondents agreed that 
maintaining the reputation of their organization is a 
motivation to developing secure mHealth apps. While 17% 
disagreed, only 2% were neutral to the statement SM2 in 
Fig. 5. 
SM3) Insecure mHealth apps have Consequences: 
Monitoring patients’ health, sending data to health 
providers, and receiving health professional decisions is one 
of the central features of mHealth apps. The consequence of 
tampered data by unauthorized entities can be damaging. 
Considering the consequences of insecure mHealth apps on 
patients’s personal and health critical information received 
the highest mutual agreement among the respondents. 85% 
of the respondents (i.e., 82 out of 97 with 50% as strongly 
agreed and 35% as agreed) affirmed that mHealth apps 
suffer from negative comments and user dissatisfaction if 
they are insecure. Only 12% disagreed and 3% remained  
neutral as SM3 in Fig. 5. Respondents emphasised that 
safety and privacy of patients’ data is their motivation to 
ensure the security of mHealth apps. Specifically, R93 
claimed that “[…] and ensuring safety is our principle and 
bottom line” and R97 claimed that, “[…], I care more about 
their safety”. Two respondents R73, and R77 indicated that 
avoiding health data leakage is their motivation to security. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Responses for Developers’ Motivations to Develop Secure mHealth Apps. 
 
SM4) Secure App Development due to Previous 
Experience of App Failure: We also wanted to examine 
the motivation for secure app development due to past  
experiences of app failure(s). 68% of the respondents agreed 
that they had experienced application failure in the past. 
Thus, it became their motivation to ensure security for the 
apps that they develop and specifically for mHealth apps. 
28% disagreed with this statement and 4% of the 
respondents were neutral as SM4 in Fig. 5. 
SM5) Secure App Development for Career Path and 
Prmotion: Despite the overwhelming challenges of 
developing secure mHealth apps, some developers puruse 
the development of secure mHealth apps as an ambitious 
activity for the sake of their intesrets and ambition. Three 
respondents, R30, R47, and R63, pointed out that personal 
interest, such as continuous learning and promotion is their 
motivations to ensure security. For example, R47 stated that 
“[I] Keep learning to improve skills [for security aware app 
development]”. 71% of the respondents affirmed that they 
develop secure mHealth apps because they look for career 
path and promotion with skills and expertise in software 
security in and secure app development in particular. 27% 
disagreed and 2% were neutral about SM5 in Fig. 5.   
SM6: Secure App Development for Reward and 
Recognition: It is considered by developers as a perconal 
achievements in terms of financial or other gains that help 
them advance their development portfolio and profile 
(relevant to SM5). Expecting a reward and recognition was 
a motivation for developing secure mHealth apps for 63% of 
the respondents who agreed with SM6 in Fig. 5. 33% 
disagreed and 4% were neutral that reward and recognitaion 
is a motivation for them to do secure app development.  
Other Motivations (Open-ened): Respondents were 
asked about ‘other’ motivating factors they see as critical 
but were not presented in the survey questions. 
a) Organizational practices for ensuring security: 
Developing secure mHealth apps cannot be achieved 
without organizational commitment such as providing 
sufficient security tools, engaging mHealth apps developers 
in security training, and employing security team leads 
[17]). Such a commitment helps to overcome the challenges, 
also mentioned in Section 4A. More importantly, it would 
strengthen the security culture of mHealth apps developers’ 
and their motivations to ensure security. Our respondents 
provided us with several responses indicating that their 
organizations are committed to security. R38 indicated that 
proper quality assurance testing is a motivation to develop 
secure mHealth apps. Respondents R31 and R33 mentioned 
that they were motivated by utilizing security tools which 
have been provided to them by their organization. 
b) Ethical obligations: Software development is an 
intellectual and effort intensive process which can be 
influenced by developers’ behaviour. Also, mHealth apps 
developers’ behaviour can affect their security practices 
(e.g., making a decision to use third-party service to process 
users’ data), and thus, impacting the security of an app. 
Thus, incorporating ethical perspective is a key to motivate 
mHealth apps developers’ to ensure security. 11 respondents 
R19, R26, R37, R43, R45, R55, R59, R68, R88, R95, R96 
believed that ensuring security is part of their ethical 
obligations. R37, R43, and R96 indicated that they were 
responsible for the security of their apps. R37 claimed that, 
“Just to help everyone if I do not do my job, why would I get 
paid?”, and R45 suggested, “The main factor which 
motivates me to develop secure mobile health apps is that, 
we need to keep in mind the security of the data which a 
user allows to share with the application and it’s duty of the 
development organization to keep that data private and 
secure that no one can misuse the data.”.  
     c) Legal obligations: Developers of mHealth apps should 
take into consideration the safety and privacy of their users 
as well as complying with laws and regulations. R3, R39, 
R48 indicated that legal liability or its consequences are 
primary motivations to ensure security. Underestimating 
security can lead to breach of policies and regulations 
resulting in governmental fines for data breaches. Failure to 
secure patients’ data could result in legal liability against the 
development organizations. R3 indicated, “I develop a 
secure mobile application because I know if any PHI 
[Personal Health Information] has been leaked, my 
organization has to pay millions of dollars”.  
      d) Reducing the cost of maintaining the app: Fixing 
security errors after developing mHealth apps can be error-
prone, costly, and time consuming [31]. Reducing the cost 
of app maintenance was perceived as a motivation to ensure 
the security of mHealth apps, responded by R40. 
VII.  DISCUSSION OF RESULTS AND FUTURE WORK 
 We now discuss the key results and highlight possible 
future research that extends findings of this study. 
A. Challenges for Secure mHealth App Development (RQ1) 
– Budget for Security in SDLC: Developers’ perspective 
(i.e., 85% of respondents as in Fig. 3) highlighted that 
allocating little or no budget to support security specific 
activities in SDLC is major concern for mHealth apps.  
– Insufficient SK: Knowledge of security mechanisms and 
implementations in development teams or at organization 
level hinders the development of secure mHealth apps, 
responded by 80% of the developers. Management support 
for the developers during apps development is extremely 
important to ensure functional as well as quality specific 
requirements that are related to security of mHealth apps.  
Needs for future research: Our analysis of the security 
challenges for mHealth apps pinpointed the need to go 
beyond developers’ view to also collect and analyze users’ 
knowledge, perception, and interests towards security and 
privacy of their data. As part of the future work, we aim to 
conduct users’ survey that can unveil security challenges 
from their perspectives (i.e., users of mHealth apps). Such a 
study can be beneficial to understand security from usability 
or users’ perspective and their involvement in SDLC (Fig. 4) 
for secure app development.  
B. Development Practices for Secure mHealth App (RQ2) 
Based on analysis of the developers’ responses, we have 
created a taxonomy of the adopted or recommended practices 
for different tasks of SDLC that represent guidelines for 
secure mHealth app development (Fig. 4).  
– Lack of Interest and Awareness in Security by Users: 62% 
of our respondents claimed that users are not explicitly 
interested or aware of security; hence, the developers’ 
compromise security related requirements in favour of 
usability and performance. Also, most of the mHealth apps 
stakeholders such as health professionals are non-expert in 
security to understand the consequences of non-secure apps. 
Their involvement in SDLC tasks such as requirements 
engineering and design for secure app development can be 
seen as a practice that enhances app security and 
stakeholders’ knowledge about security issues. 
 Needs for future research: Our taxonomy of the 
developers’ recommended practices in Fig. 4 suggests further 
investigation on the impact of the identified practices on 
secure mHealth apps. There is also a need to educate 
developers and disseminating knowledge about best practices 
and patterns to improve development of secure apps.  
C. Motivating Factors to Develop Secure mHealth App 
– Consequences of Insecure mHealth Apps: Developers’ 
perspective (i.e., 85% respondents in Fig. 5) suggested that 
top factor that motivates secure mHealth app development is 
to avoid any legal, social, and commercial consequences of 
deploying insecure apps.  
– Vision and Reputation of Organization: Developers are 
also motivated to deliver secure mHealth apps to maintain 
the vision and reputation of the development organization 
they work for, suggested by 81% of the respondents.  
– Security Leads to Influence Secure SDLC: Dedicated team 
leads or security experts influence app developers to ensure 
security throughout SDLC. These leaders inspire and guide 
developers to satisfy security requirement and avoid security 
risks. However, 36% of the respondents disagreed and 
suggested that security leaders had not motivated or affected 
their development process and practices. To further analyze 
the rationale for their suggestion, we looked into their 
demographic information (i.e., team size from Fig. 2) and 
[26] to know that 50% of those respondents work as part-
time of a team that consists of eight team members at 
maximum. This indicates that possibly there is a lack of 
security leadership within the app development team.  
Needs for future research: There is a need for future 
work to investigate ethical considerations (as a motivating 
factor) for mHealth apps developer, especially when dealing 
with stakeholders who are not explicitly interested in 
security. Such an examination would explore the role of 
developers with social and legal responsibilities of secure 
apps development. Further work can be done to explore the 
role of security leaders for ensuring the security, and how 
they affect and motivate team members. 
VIII. THREAT TO VALIDITY 
 Threat I – Source and Analysis of Survey Data: We 
acknowledge that using one source for data collection (i.e., 
online survey) may affect our results. We believe that we did 
not achieve data triangulation that potentially reduces 
accuracy of the findings. Another possible threat relates to 
sampling of respondents. We recruited the developers who 
have experience of developing mHealth apps (Fig. 2, Section 
III). We explained the eligibility characteristics in survey 
preamble and all other recruitment documents (e.g., email 
invitation, post description). We asked the respondents to 
provide us with a concrete example of mHealth apps which 
they have developed to ensure their experience and 
eligibility. Furthermore, since we offered Amazon gift cards 
for respondents who provided us with eligible and complete 
response, there can be a threat of multiple responses by same 
respondent, especially those who have developed more than 
one mHealth app. Our study may be affected as qualitative 
data collection and analysis may cause irrelevant themes and 
misinterpretation. To overcome this threat, the first author 
performed the analysis and created initial codes. The third 
author assessed the generated codes, followed by a 
discussion to confirm the final themes (Section III). 
 Threat II – Survey Data Collection and Sample Size: 
Questionnaire-based research faces the risk of being 
misunderstood or misinterpreted by respondents. We 
conducted pilot survey with questionnaire to overcome 
wording and ambiguity issues (as in Fig. 2). We made some 
questions compulsory to answer. It was hard to reach 
respondents who responded earlier to seek their inputs for the 
compulsory questions. After sending several emails, we only 
received a few replies. However, we believe that our study 
has a convenience sample (i.e., N=97) based on available 
pool of mHealth apps developers. All our respondents have 
at least developed one mHealth app, are geographically 
diversified, and have different expertise and team size that 
reflects minimum knowledge and expertise to respond.  
IX. CONCLUSIONS 
Mobile computing empowers health care stakeholders – 
offering portable, context-sensitive, and pervasive computing 
– to produce and consume healthcare services [1]. Mobile 
apps in general and mHealth apps in particular face critical 
challenges related to security and privacy of users’ 
information and health critical data. We conducted an 
empirical study by collecting, analyzing, synthesizing, and 
documenting responses about secure app development from 
97 mHealth app developers from across the World. The 
study is primarily focused on three objectives expressed as 
RQs, i.e., (i) what are the challenges? (ii) which development 
practices are critical? and (iii) how motivating factors 
impact the development of secure mHealth apps. The results 
of this study can benefit researchers and practitioners with 
empirical knowledge about security specific challenges and 
opportunities to develop secure mHealth apps. 
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